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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ects of private debts on risk sharing and welfare, in which I assume individual
residents have access to both international and domestic capital markets. Like Jeske (2006), I make the
assumption that domestic residents cannot commit to repay their debts across border. The previous
literature assumes contracts are perfectly enforceable within border, and hence the marginal rate of
substitution must be equal among all residents in any one country. The novel feature in this model
is to bring limited commitment into debt contracts signed between domestic residents. The pervasive
risk of repudiation creates di¤erent domestic asset pricing rules for countries that are constrained in
international nancial market. Constrained countrys domestic interest rate is equal to the reciprocal
of the lowest marginal rate of substitution within that country. However, non-constrained countries
still have equalized marginal rate of substitution which determines the international interest rate. A
wider gap between domestic and international nancing cost emerges in this model and leads to harsher
punishment for international debt defaulters. Although limited domestic risk sharing hinders aggregate
welfare reaching an even higher standard, it has no negative e¤ect on the original level in Jeskes setup. As
a result, my model allows more international risk sharing and higher welfare. I show how this improvement
depends on the interaction between preventing within and across border default in equilibrium. I also
explore the role of endogenous borrowing constraints, international borrowing by using other domestic
residents as intermediaries and the specication of deviation penalty.
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1 Introduction
In the presence of limited commitment, regardless of complete nancial markets, international loans are
available only to the extent that their repayments can be enforced by the threat of reversion to autarky.
Frictions of this kind result in limited risk sharing between countries across the world. The size of risk
sharing is determined by the specication of the outside option. Jeske (2006) predicts that a centralized
arrangement, where only government borrows internationally and redistributes domestically, allows more
international risk sharing and higher aggregate welfare than a decentralized arrangement, where individual
residents have access to capital markets. An intuitive proof is as follow. One can think of the decentralized
arrangement as a centralized setup only this imaginary government assumes that it can ignore the resource
constraint in autarky after default and instead keep borrowing at domestic interest rate just like residents,
which is a better outside option than pure autarky in the original centralized arrangement. Higher post-
default value leads to tighter participation constraint in international nancial market and accordingly smaller
capital ow. A crucial assumption in this proof is that domestic debts are perfectly enforceable. For this
very reason, the decentralized arrangement is equivalent to an corresponding imaginary planners problem,
in which the marginal rate of substitution (MRS, from now on) is equalized across all residents within any
country.
In this paper, I add limited commitment problem in debt contracts signed between domestic residents.
This revision introduces a new way of deviation from risk sharing agreement: domestic debt default. The
penalty for domestic debt defaulters is harsher than international debt defaulters. While international debt
defaulters are excluded from international nancial market but retain access to domestic nancial market,
domestic debt defaulters are prohibited to participate in all nancial markets. This assumption of some
discrimination against foreign creditors seems to me more realistic than the previous one of innite dis-
crimination in which domestic creditors are fully protected. This paper shows that limited commitment
of domestic debts has opposite e¤ects on countrys aggregate welfare after globalization. Pervasive risk of
default may hamper domestic exchange and worsen welfare, whereas it can raise the volume of international
capital ow thus improve welfare. The reason for the latter statement is as follow. Thanks to participation
constraints in domestic nancial market, international debt defaulters now confront more severe punishment
than before. After a default, the channel of using other non-defaulted domestic residents as intermediaries
to access international nancial market is restricted. In contrast, international debt defaulters in Jeskes
setup can lend and borrow freely and indirectly in international nancial market afterwards. The ques-
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tion then is which e¤ect dominates. I prove that when residents are heterogeneous and there exist some
residents who are sometimes on the edge of reneging on domestic debt, the positive e¤ect enables these
residents to enjoy welfare gains from an increment in foreign capital ow while the welfare levels for others
stay una¤ected. Although the negative e¤ect hinders aggregate welfare reaching an even higher standard
when comparing with a centralized distribution mechanism, it is not functioning as by reference to Jeskes
decentralized arrangement. Therefore, more international risk sharing and higher (at least the same if there
are no indi¤erent residents) aggregate welfare can be supported in my amended model when comparing with
Jeskes decentralized arrangement. The policy implication is that perfect domestic risk sharing and innite
discrimination against foreign creditors together lower the level of international risk sharing if pervasive risk
of default is a fact of life. There is a rationale for government in decentralized countries to exchange perfect
domestic enforcement for better international connections.
Now that aggregate welfare has been improved by not enforcing domestic debt contracts, does govern-
ments still want to control private capital and carry out the centralized arrangement? The answer depends
on the trade-o¤ that centralization wins by gains from domestic exchange but may lose by few gains from
international exchange. In a numerical example, I show that capital control is always the best disregarding
domestic limited commitment if the endowment structure is such that international income uctuation is
large relative to domestic income uctuation.
The novel commitment problem within border also overturns the domestic bond pricing rule for countries
that are participation constrained in equilibrium. In closed economy models with heterogeneous residents,
domestic interest rate is determined by the highest MRS possible in that economy to ensure repayment.1 In
open economy models with perfect domestic enforcement, international interest rate is determined by the
highest MRS in all countries across the world, whereas domestic interest rate is determined by the equalized
MRS within any country.2 In this model, international interest rate is, as usual, determined by highest
MRS, however, domestic interest rate is equalized to the reciprocal of the lowest MRS among all residents.
This result is consistent with the assumption that international debt defaulters are penalized harsher in my
model. When international debt defaulters come down to seeking help in domestic nancial market, they
face a wider gap between domestic and international nancing cost since domestic bond price is lower than
ever. This cruel situation raises international borrowing quota for all residents and pays o¤ by higher welfare
1Bond price is negatively related to corresponding interest rate. When price is determined by the highest MRS, interest rate
is the loweset possible. See, for example, Alvarez and Jermann (2000, 2001) and Azariadis and Lambertini (2002).
2See, for example, Jeske (2006) and Wright (2006).
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level.
Of critical importance in this strand of literature is the specication of what defaulters may be entitled.
In the remainder of this section, I review several closely related work which try to relax the assumption of
compelet exclusion from future trading in early theories.3
A growing research body uses the assumption of partial exclusion, under which defaulters retain some
access to nancial markets or have alternative ways to smooth consumption. International risk sharing
diminishes in size since life after default is less painful than it would be otherwise. Partial exclusion arises
if defaulters can reenter foreign capital market indirectly through intermediaries as in Jeske (2006). Wright
(2006) builds on Jeskes model and argues that international borrowing subsidies can also lead to constrained
e¢ cient allocations instead of Jeskes radical way of centralization. Defaulters continuing to have access to
international savings may also cause partial exclusion. Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989) rst use this idea and prove
that international borrowing cannot be supported in a small open economy that takes the international
interest rate as given (partial equilibrium). Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2007) carry their work further to a
multi-country (general equilibrium) setup in which they show that international risk sharing can exist with
low interest rate. Then Wright establishes an equivalence between the above two modeling methods if the
extra dimension of heterogeneity among residents in Jeskes model is taken care of. Reduced penalty can be
due to other internal opportunities as well. For example, Kehoe and Perri (2002, 2004) study international
risk sharing in a real business cycle model under productivity shock, in which autarky value depends on the
quantity of capital the country has accumulated up to defaults. In their paper, defaulters can continue to
produce and consume capital in autarky, but they may not buy or sell capital and other nancial assets to
foreigners.
Broner and Ventura (2009) assume that countries cannot discriminate against foreign creditors. Thus,
international risk sharing is obtained even in the absence of international debt default penalties. Unlike my
model in which residents make default decisions, in their setup government endogenously chooses whether
to enforce all debt contracts or none. They show that decrease in trade barriers in goods market facilitates
international trade and raises the costs of enforcement. As a result, globalization might hamper domestic
trade and lower aggregate welfare. In this paper, government can identify the citizenship but still chooses
to enforce none because more international risk sharing can be supported.
3See, for example, Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), Alvarez and Jermann (2000) and Kehoe and Perri (2002,
2004)
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the model of private in-
ternational lending and borrowing with limited commitment problem within and across border and derive
equilibrium results. Section 3 compares aggregate welfare level in di¤erent setups, thus generates some policy
implications. Section 4 introduces a crude numerical example which illustrates the essence of this paper.
Section 5 concludes and nally a technical appendix contains all proofs.
2 The Model
The model considers a world that consists of a nite number of countries denoted asm 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg and each
countrym is populated by N types of residents with a continuum of them in each type n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng :4 Res-
idents live forever so that time is innite and discrete, denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; :::;1: Information about current
and future endowments is indexed by the state t 2 : History is summarized in t  f0; 1; 2; :::; tg 2 t
with 0 given. Transition probability from history t to next periods state t+1 is known as (t+1jt) with
t given. (t) is the unconditional probability of observing history t and (rjt) is the probability of ob-
serving history r conditional on having been in t: There is only one non-storable consumption good which
can be exchanged within and across border. I denote by emn (
t) the endowment of type n in country m after
history t and by cmn (
t) the corresponding consumption. There are M domestic bonds for each country m
and only one international bond traded across the world. Let bmn (
t; t+1) and fmn (
t; t+1) respectively be
the amounts of domestic and foreign state-contingent securities held by agents of type n living in country m;
which are purchased at t and for payment next period in state t+1; pm(
t; t+1) and q(
t; t+1) are their
respective prices.
For all n andm, I use  2 (0; 1) as the discount factor and denote by U() the period utility function which
is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously di¤erentiable. Type n residents in country m
have preferences
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r));
4Unlike Jeske, I assume that in any country m the mass of type n residents mn is normalized to 1 for all n 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng :
Note that in Jeskes model ones endowment only depends on type. Although living in di¤erent countries, same types receive
the same endowment each period. As a result, having mn = 1 for all n and m in Jeske would imply that countries are identical
ex-ante, thus there may not be any role for international capital ow. However, in this paper ones endowment vary upon both
type and country, which will be clear after I introduce history and endowment structure. Assuming mn = 1 simplies notation,
whereas still justies international borrowing and lending.
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after t with t 2 [0;1) :
I take the existence of limited commitment problem as a fact of life. In particular, debt contracts
between any two parties are not enforced. Previous theories have instead assumed that debt contracts
between domestic residents and foreigners are not enforced while all domestic payments are perfectly enforced.
Border still matters here because default within border leads to di¤erent penalty from default across border.
International debt defaulters can still trade internationally indirectly, through borrowing from other non-
defaulted domestic residents in the same country. I refer this situation as residents international autarky
henceforth. However, domestic debt defaulters would be denied from all nancial markets, which I call
residents autarky hereafter.
Despite the fact whether residents have defaulted on international debt or not, the continuation value for
type n residents in country m who renege on domestic debt at r is
Amn (
r) 
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(emn (s)): (RA)
Denition 1 Type n residents in country m live in residents autarky after any history r if their period
consumption cm;An (
s) = emn (
s) for all histories s with s 2 [r;1):
Since all residents are small relative to the market, individual defaulter on international debt does so at
t by assuming that the sequence of all future domestic bond prices fpm(r; r+1)gr2[t;1) stays unchanged.
Consider type n residents in country m who renege on international debt alone at t, their continuation
value in residents international autarky can be represented as
V mn (
t; bmn (
t))  max
fcmn (r);bmn (r;r+1)gr2[t;1)
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)); (RIA)
subject to the budget constraint
emn (
r) + bmn (
r) > cmn (r) +
X
r+1
pm(r; r+1)b
m
n (
r; r+1); (1)
the participation constraint in domestic nancial markets
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(cmn (s)) > Amn (r); (2)
the no-Ponzi condition
bmn (
r; r+1) >  B;
with
bmn (
t) and pm(r; r+1) given,
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for all histories r and states (r; r+1) with r 2 [t;1) : bmn (t) denotes the domestic bond holdings residents
inherit when entering period t: B > 0 is large enough such that no-Ponzi conditions never bind in equilibrium,
which ensures compactness of the budget set. For the problem to be interesting, I assume for some n;m and
t there exist future histories r at which domestic participation constraints (2) are binding.
Unlike Jeskes model, in which domestic debt default is not allowed in nature though it might be a better
choice in some future histories r if
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(cmn (s)) < Amn (r) with r > t;
this model prevents domestic debt defaults at all future histories r with r 2 [t;1) by a set of constraints
(2).
Denition 2 Given a price sequence fpm(r; r+1); q(r; r+1)gr2[t;1) and domestic bond holdings bmn (t);
type n residents in country m live in residents international autarky after any history t if their
consumption allocation fcm;Dn (r)gr2[t;1) solves residents international autarky problem (RIA).
Up to now, I have dened the outside options for domestic debt defaulters in (RA) and international
debt defaulters in (RIA). We are ready to write down residents problem before any default. Residents
choose sequences for consumption and for both domestic and international bond holdings to maximize life
time preference
max
fcmn (t);bmn (t;t+1);fmn (t;t+1)gt2[0;1)
1X
t=0
t
X
t
(t)U(cmn (
t)); (RP)
subject to the budget constraint
emn (
t) + bmn (
t) + fmn (
t)
> cmn (t) +
X
t+1
pm(t; t+1)b
m
n (
t; t+1) +
X
t+1
q(t; t+1)f
m
n (
t; t+1); (3)
the participation constraint in international nancial markets
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)) > V mn (t; bmn (t)); (4)
the participation constraint in domestic nancial markets
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)) > Amn (t); (5)
the no-Ponzi conditions
bmn (
t; t+1) >  B; fmn (t; t+1) >  F ;
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with initial bond holdings
bmn (
0); fmn (
0) given
and bond price sequences
pm(t; t+1); q(
t; t+1) given,
for all histories t and states
 
t; t+1

with t 2 [0;1) : No-Ponzi conditions again require B and F > 0 to
be large enough to ensure that these two constraints never bind.
To solve the problem, notice that international participation constraint (4) implies the domestic partici-
pation constraint (5) for all t with t 2 [0;1) : By denition,
V mn (
t; bmn (
t)) > Amn (t) for all t:
The reason is that problem (RA)s consumption allocation

cm;An (
r)
	
r2[t;1) is always a¤ordable and individ-
ual rational in problem (RIA). Intuitively, no one reneges on domestic debt before a default on international
debt in equilibrium. This is a direct result from the assumption of harsher penalty for domestic debt de-
faulters than international debt defaulters. Hence, constraint (5) is redundant in nding optimal solutions as
can be seen in Figure 1. This cut simplies life since domestic enforcement problem will only a¤ect optimal
allocation indirectly through the utility level of residents international autarky, i.e., V mn (
t; bmn (
t)). Rest of
this section rst denes, then characterizes the equilibrium results.
Denition 3 A trade equilibrium is an allocation fcmn (t); bmn (t; t+1); fmn (t; t+1)gt2[0;1) and a price
sequence fpm(t; t+1); q(t; t+1)gt2[0;1) such that each type solves residents problem (RP) given prices and
initial bond holdings, while resource feasibility
MX
m=1
NX
n=1
cmn (
t) 
MX
m=1
NX
n=1
emn (
t);
domestic nancial markets clearing condition
NX
n=1
bmn (
t; t+1) = 0; for all m;
and international nancial market clearing condition
MX
m=1
NX
n=1
fmn (
t; t+1) = 0;
are satised for all histories t and states
 
t; t+1

with t 2 [0;1) :
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The Lagrangian of the residents problem (RP) is (drop the superscript and subscript for simplicity)
LRP =
1X
t=0
t
X
t
(t)U(c(t)) +
+
1X
t=0
X
t
(t)

e(t) + b(t) + f(t)  c(t)
 
1X
t=0
X
t
(t)

p(t; t+1)b(
t; t+1) + q(
t; t+1)f(
t; t+1)

+
1X
t=0
X
t
(t)
24 1X
s=t
s t
X
sjt
(sjt)U(c(s))  V (t; bmn (t))
35 ;
where mn (
t) and mn (
t) denote respectively the Lagrange multipliers on the budget constraint (3) and
international participation constraint (4) if t occurs.
First order conditions are: with respect to c(t);
t(t)U 0(c(t))  (t) +
tX
s=0
(s)t s
X
tjs
(tjs)U 0(c(t)) = 0; (6)
with respect to b(t; t+1);
 p(t; t+1)(t) + (t; t+1)  (t; t+1)dV (
t; t+1; b(
t; t+1))
db(t; t+1)
= 0; (7)
and with respect to f(t; t+1);
 q(t; t+1)(t) + (t; t+1) = 0: (8)
Rearrange (6) to get
(t) = r t(t)U 0(c(t))
241 + tX
s=0
X
tjs
(s) s
(tjs)
(t)
35 : (9)
Before using (7), I went back and solved the post-default optimization problem (RIA) in order to get a closed
form of its envelope condition, dV (
t;t+1;b(
t;t+1))
db(t;t+1)
.
To solve (RIA) with initial history t, rst write down the Lagrangian.
LRIA =
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(c(r))
+
1X
r=t
X
rjt
(r)
24e(r) + b(r)  c(r) X
r+1
p(r; r+1)b(
r; r+1)
35
+
1X
r=t
X
rjt
(r)
24 1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(c(s)) Amn (r)
35 :
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Let mn (
r) and mn (
r) be the multipliers on the budget constraint (1) and domestic participation constraint
(2) if r occurs. First order condition with respect to c(r) is
r t(rjt)U 0(c(r))  (r) +
rX
s=t
(s)r s
X
rjs
(rjs)U 0(c(r)) = 0:
Rewrite it to get
(r) = r t(rjt)U 0(c(r))
241 + rX
s=t
X
rjs
(s)t s
(rjs)
(rjt)
35 : (10)
Given initial domestic bond holdings bmn (
t); envelope theorem yields
dV (t; b(t))
db(t)
=
@LRIA
@b(t)
= (t): (11)
Combine (10) and (11) together.
dV (t; b(t))
db(t)
= t t(tjt)U 0(cD(t))
241 + tX
s=t
X
tjs
(s)t s
(tjs)
(tjt)
35
=

1 + (t)

U 0(cD(t));
where cD(t) is the rst element in the optimal consumption allocation

cD(r)
	
r2[t;1) that solves (RIA)
with initial history t. Iterating dV (
t;b(t))
db(t)
one period forward generates
dV (t; t+1; b(
t; t+1))
db(t; t+1)
=

1 + (t; t+1)

U 0(cD(t; t+1)): (12)
Now continue with problem (RP). Substitute (12) into (7) and solve for the domestic bond price together
with (9).
p(t; t+1) =
(t; t+1)  (t; t+1)dV (
t;t+1;b(
t;t+1))
db(t;t+1)
(t)
=
(t; t+1)  (t; t+1)

1 + (t; t+1)

U 0(cD(t; t+1))
(t)
= 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)
1 +A2  
 
1 + (t; t+1)

A1
1 +A3
; (13)
where
A1 = (
t; t+1)
 t 1U 0(cD(
t; t+1))
U 0(c(t; t+1))
1
(t; t+1)
;
A2 =
t+1X
s=0
X
t;t+1js
(s) s
(t; t+1js)
(t; t+1)
;
A3 =
tX
s=0
X
tjs
(s) s
(tjs)
(t)
:
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Finally, solve for international bond price with (8) and (9).
q(t; t+1) =
(t; t+1)
(t)
= 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)1 +A2
1 +A3
: (14)
Most propositions in this section closely follow Jeske (2006) with slight change to accommodate the
enforcement problem within border. In country m; consider residents of some types n  f1; 2; :::; Ng for
whom mn (
t) > 0 with t 2 [0;1); i.e., they are internationally participation constrained at t in trade
equilibrium. In contrast to the work by Jeske, these constrained types might be di¤erent from each other
because of domestic enforcement problem. Specically, type n residents fall into two categories: type nA and
nB with nA [ nB = n: In residents international autarky, type nA with vmnA(r) = 0 for all r 2 [t;1)
are never domestically participation constrained while type nB with vmnB (
r) > 0 for some r 2 [t;1) are
sometimes domestically participation constrained at r:
Type n residents at the brink of default attain the same continuation value by staying with trade equi-
librium and reversing to residents international autarky. Proposition 1 states that types n also consume the
same amount of goods at every future history from t on irrespective of reneging on international debt.
Proposition 1 In trade equilibrium, if mn (
t) > 0 for some n;m and t with t 2 [0;1) ; then cm;Dn (r) and
cmn (
r) are identical for all r happening with positive probability and r 2 [t;1); where cm;Dn (r)	r2[t;1) and
fcmn (r)gr2[0;1) respectively denote the optimal consumption allocations in residents international autarky
problem (RIA) started at r and in residents problem (RP).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
I get the same result above as in Jeskes (2006) proposition 1, which has been extremely useful in
proving all following propositions. Proposition 2 states that, for any country and history, either every type
is internationally participation constrained or no type is, even if types are heterogeneous.
Proposition 2 For all m and (t; t+1) with t 2 [0;1) ; either q(t; t+1) > pm(t; t+1) and mn (t; t+1) >
0 for all n; or q(t; t+1) = pm(
t; t+1) and mn (
t; t+1) = 0 for all n:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
All types in country m must be participation constrained in international nancial market at the same
time. Otherwise, it would be protable for non-constrained types to borrow internationally up to their
constraints and relend at a higher interest rate to constrained ones. No arbitrage in equilbrium allows us
to replace internationally constrained residents with the notion of internationally constrained country. This
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result is again the same as Jeskes (2006) proposition 4. Removing the assumption of perfectly enforceable
contracts within border, therfore, does not alter the basic characteristics of countries that are internationally
participation constrained in trade equilibrium. However, within the border of any constrained country,
domestic enforcement problem a¤ects the restrictions imposed on type nB when participating in international
nancial market.
If type nB residents from one internationally constrained country indeed choose to default on international
debt at t and instead live in residents international autarky thereafter, then they will again nd themselves
indi¤erent between reneging on and repaying domestic debt at some future history r: Proposition 3 says that
type nB residents can neither borrow nor lend domestically beyond some constant domestic debt holdings
at t 1 in trade equilibrium.
Proposition 3 In trade equilibrium, for some n;m and t with t 2 (0;1) ; if mn (r) > 0 at r with
r 2 [t;1) in addition to mn (t) > 0; then
bmn (
t) = B
m
n (
t);
where B
m
n (
t) is some constant determined by
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(cm;Dn (s; t; B
m
n (
t))) = Amn (
r):
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
when it comes to decide the domestic bond holdings bmnB (
t) at t 1; type nB residents in internationally
constrained country must buy a specied amount B
m
nB (
r) even if they want to borrow or lend more. This
observation is critical to prove the next two propositions. Meanwhile, type nA residents in the same country
can freely choose their domestic bond holdings, but they do not want to deviate whenever the optimum is
arrivied.
In general, the international participation constraint (4) makes residents problem (RP) non-convex.
Proposition 4 justies the su¢ ciency of rst-order-condition approach for a maximum. A similar method
has been used in the proof of Jeskes (2006) proposition 2. First of all, I dene an alternative maximization
problem with the same objective function and a convex constraint set that is a superset of the non-convex
constraint set in the original non-convex problem. Then I show that a solution to the original problem is
also a¤ordable and individually rational in the alternative convex problem. It turns out that both problems
have identical rst order conditions, thus the same optimal solutions. Therefore, the rst order conditions
for the alternative problem also characterize the global maximum of the original problem.
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Proposition 4 For all n and m; together with a transversality condition
lim
T!1
T
X
T
U 0(cmn (
T ))(T )
h
bmn (
T ) + fmn (
T )
i
= 0;
rst order conditions (7), (8) and (9) are su¢ cient to characterize the maximum of (RP).
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Proposition 5 shows how domestic and international bond prices are determined in trade equilibrium.
The domestic bond pricing rule di¤ers from the one in Jeskes (2006) proposition 3 since MRSs across
di¤erent types in any internationally constrained country are no longer equalized in general.
Proposition 5 In trade equilibrium, for all n;m and
 
t; t+1

with t 2 [0;1) ;
(I) the international bond price in the world is
q(t; t+1) = max
m=1;:::;M ;n=1;:::;N


U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt)

;
(II) the domestic bond price in country m 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg is
pm(t; t+1) = min
n=1;:::;N


U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt)

;
and nally
(III) the relationship between international bond price and all M domestic bond prices is
q(t; t+1) = max
m=1;:::;M

pm(t; t+1)
	
:
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
In the rst part, the international bond price is equal to the maximum MRS among all N types and across
all M countries. Intuitively, international interest rate has to be to the lowest so that repaying international
debt would not hurt debtors as much as living isolated from the world.
The second part says that the domestic bond price in m is equal to the minimum MRS among all N
types in m. This rule overturns the result from closed economy models in which price must be the highest to
guarantee the incentive of fullling debtors obligation. The reason is that domestic debt default can never
occur without an international debt default in this paper. In contrast to closed economy models, domestic
interest rate as a device to ensure repayment is no longer needed. Instead, domestic interest rate plays
aother role of punishing international debt defaulters harsher and raising the ceiling of foreign capital inow.
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Consider a country with mn (
t; t+1) > 0 for example. When its residents are contemplating international
debt default, they nd themselves more miserable in residents international autarky since the domestic
interest rate is higher than the level they would have accepted. Country with mn (
t; t+1) = 0 is a special
case in part two since the MRSs are equalized among all N types in this unconstrained country. Moreover,
its domestic bond price must equal to the international bond price in order to rule out the possibilities
of arbitrage. All the above results combining together reveals the relationship between international and
domestic bond prices in the thrid part.
3 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I rank the aggregate welfare level in two scenarios for any country m 2 f1; 2; :::;Mg. The
rst scenario is Jeskes private international borrowing setup in which only debt contracts across border are
subject to the risk of repudiation. The second scenario is my decentralized model presented in section 2,
in which both within and across border contracts are not enforced. I can show that country ms aggregate
welfare in my model is higher than Jeskes setup given some exogenous welfare-weighted index.
Recall Jeske (2001, 2006), after type n residents in country m renege on international debt at t, their
value can be represented as
V m;Jn (
t; bmn (
t))  max
fcmn (r);bmn (r;r+1)gr2[t;1)
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)); (RIAJ)
subject to the budget constraint
emn (
r) + bmn (
r) > cmn (r) +
X
r+1
pm(r; r+1)b
m
n (
r; r+1);
the no-Ponzi condition
bmn (
r; r+1) >  B;
with
bmn (
t) and pm(r; r+1) given,
for all histories r and all states (r; r+1) with r 2 [t;1) :
Again at date 0 before any default could happen, residents problem is to choose sequences for consump-
tion and for holdings of both domestic and international bonds to maximize life time utility
max
fcmn (t);bmn (t;t+1);fmn (t;t+1)gt2[0;1)
1X
t=0
t
X
t
(t)U(cmn (
t)); (RPJ)
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subject to the budget constraint
emn (
t) + bmn (
t) + fmn (
t)
> cmn (t) +
X
t+1
pm(t; t+1)b
m
n (
t; t+1) +
X
t+1
q(t; t+1)f
m
n (
t; t+1);
the participation constraint in international nancial markets
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)) > V m;Jn (t; bmn (t)); (15)
the no-Ponzi conditions
bmn (
t; t+1) >  B; fmn (t; t+1) >  F ;
with initial bond holdings
bmn (
0); fmn (
0) given
and bond price sequences
pm(t; t+1); q(
t; t+1) given,
for all histories t and all states
 
t; t+1

with t 2 [0;1) :
For any m; all types in my model achieve higher or at least the same welfare level than in Jeskes setup
above. One intuitive explanation is that type nB residents now confront with more severe penalty after
international debt default (lower continuation value in residents international autarky). Assume a small open
economy m stops enforcing domestic contracts after a bad shock. Type nAs optimization problem can still
be dened by (RPJ), thus their welfare level stays the same. However, type nBs optimization problem shifts
from (RPJ) to (RP). Types nB residentsoriginal optimal allocations in (RPJ) are both a¤ordable in (RP),
since bond prices determined by type nA stay unchanged, and individual rational in (RP), since international
participation constraints (4) are less tighter than (15) and the newly added domestic participation constraints
(5) are superuous. If there do exist type nB residents whose domestic participation constraints (2) bind
after some future histories in (RIA) when their country is internationally constrained after some present
histories in (RP), and if there are positive international capital inows at these present histories in (RP),
then type nB residents after the shock can do strictly better by relaxing their international participation
constraints (4) at present histories in (RP). Adding up welfare levels of all types with exogenously given
weights assigned to each type, the countrys aggregate welfare is improved since type nA residents stay the
same and type nB residents are strictly better o¤. The following proposition 6 formalizes this argument.
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Proposition 6 Assume the welfare-weighted index is given by f'mn gNn=1 with 'mn 2 R++ for all n in
any m. Let

cmn
 
t

; bmn (
t; t+1); f
m
n (
t; t+1)
	
t2[0;1)
solves residents problem (RP) in section 2 and
cm;Jn
 
t

; bm;Jn (
t; t+1); f
m;J
n (
t; t+1)
	
t2[0;1) solves residents problem (RP
J) in Jeske (2006). Then
NX
n=1
'mn
1X
t=0
t
X
t
(t)U(cmn (
t)) >
NX
n=1
'mn
1X
t=0
t
X
t
(t)U(cm;Jn (
t))
with strict inequality if there is type n at history (t; t+1) with fm;Jn (
t; t+1) < 0 (non-autarkic allocation)
and
U 0(cmn (
t;t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
6= U
0(cm1 (
t;t+1))
U 0(cm1 (t))
for some n (imperfect sharing domestically).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
4 Numerical Example
I illustrate my results through a simple example in this section. Consider a world of country 1 and 2, each
of them is populated by a unit mass of residents with static preference U(c) = log(c). Residents born at
period 0 live forever and time is discrete. A sort of non-storable goods is traded every period.
The initial endowment structure in the world could be 1 + y in 1 and 1   y in 2 or 1   y in 1 and
1 + y in 2. But after the initial endowment in each country is known, aggregate endowment alternates
between high state and low state deterministically. Residents in each country could be type A, who faces
idiosyncratic endowment shock with negative " in low state and positive " in high state, or type B who faces
just the opposite shock as type A. It is assumed that y is large relative to ", capturing the idea that income
uctuations across countries are much volatile than income uctuations within a country.
The timeline of contracting is as follow before any transaction. First of all, domestic debt contracts
are signed between residents within the same country. Secondly, a coin ip determines the type of half
random residents in both countries, and then domestic contracts are either enforced under the assumption
of full domestic commitment or subject to default risk under the assumption of no domestic commitment.
Thirdly, international debt contracts are signed between domestic residents and foreigners. Eventually,
another independent coin ip determines the initial endowment structure in the world, and agents will not
deviate from ex-ante international agreement if they are as better o¤ as autarky.
Without loss of generality, suppose country 1 has initial aggregate endowment 1 + y. Then, the endow-
ment structure at period 0 can be summarized in Table 1, where superscript m = f1; 2g denotes country
and subscript n = fA;Bg denotes type. Table 2 summarizes the endowment structure at period 1 and the
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endowment structure in either country repeats itself every two periods. Therefore, country 1 is interna-
tionally participation constrained at all even numbered periods 0; 2; 4; :::;1, even type B with a relatively
lower endowment. At all odd numbered periods 1; 3; 5; :::;1; country 1 as a borrower is unconstrained in
international nancial markets.
After the type is known to residents and before the realization of initial aggregate endowment for countries,
a representative resident of any type has expected life time preference
E [u(z)] =
1
2
[log(1 + z) +  log(1  z)] + 1
2
[log(1  z) +  log(1 + z)] ;
where z represents consumption deviation and  denotes discount factor. E [u(z)] is strictly decreasing in z
as depicted in Figure 2. More international risk sharing means higher ex-ante welfare.
4.1 Private Borrowing with Full Commitment Domestically
Because domestic debt contracts are perfectly enforced, di¤erent types in the same country consume the
same amount of goods every period. The consumption pattern in the world is as follow
c1t = 1 + x
J ; c1t+1 = 1  xJ ; for country 1;
c2t = 1  xJ ; c2t+1 = 1 + xJ ; for country 2.
Country 1 is participation constrained in international nancial market at period 0, which implies that the
present value of all future net payments to foreigners when discounted by Arrow-Debreu domestic bond
prices is zero.5
xJ   y + q  y   xJ
1  pq = 0: (16)
The price for international bonds today denoted by q is determined by the MRS in countries that are
unconstrained next period. In other words, international bond price can be found in countries whose residents
consume 1 + xJ today and 1  xJ tomorrow.
q = 
1 + xJ
1  xJ : (17)
And p denotes the price for domestically traded bonds when the country is participation constrained next
period
p = 
1  xJ
1 + xJ
:
5See the derivation in Appendix A.7.
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The price sequences for domestic bonds traded in country 1 and country 2 are
p1 =
8><>: p; for period 0; 2; 4; :::q; for period 1; 3; 5; ::: ; (18)
p2 =
8><>: q; for period 0; 2; 4; :::p; for period 1; 3; 5; ::: :
There are two solutions to equation (16). The rst is autarky, or xJ = y; while the second requires q = 1;
which further implies xJ = 1 1+ using equation (17).
4.2 Centralized Borrowing
Consider a world of two centralized economies where government lends and borrows internationally, decides
whether or not to renege on debt owned by the country, and apportions total endowment plus net foreign
capital inow among residents. This government regulation is introduced to help the welfare comparison
between my model and Jeskes setup. Because of governments intervention in domestic allocation, one can
aggregate each country into a representative agent with the following consumption pattern
c1t = 1 + x
c; c1t+1 = 1  xc; for country 1;
c2t = 1  xc; c2t+1 = 1 + xc; for country 2,
where xc is the minimum deviation satisfying country 1s international participation constraint at time t
xc = min
z>0
fz : log(1 + z) +  log(1  z)  log(1 + y) +  log(1  y)g :
For the problem to be interesting, I am looking for the situation in which some (not full) risk sharing can
be supported across centralized economy. This is only possible given two restrictions on endowment are
satised. The rst one is
 <   log(1 + y)
log(1  y) ; (19)
otherwise countries can fully smooth consumption, xc = 0 as in Figure 3. The second one is
 >
1  y
1 + y
;
or equivalently
y >
1  
1 + 
; (20)
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otherwise autarky is the highest utility one can achieve and there is no trade in equilibrium, xc = y as in
Figure 4.
If (19) and (20) are both satised, some international risk sharing can be supported across border. As
can be seen in Figure 5, the risk sharing level in centralized economy turns out to be better than the private
international borrowing with full domestic commitment in section 4.1,
0 < xc <
1  
1 + 
< y:
Given that xJ = 1 1+ or y; I know the following relationship
0 < xc < xJ 6 y:
4.3 Private Borrowing with Limited Commitment Domestically
Next I remove the assumption of perfect enforcement on domestic debts. Therefore, type A and type B
agents in the same country might have di¤erent consumption allocations. As a result, the allocations in
trade equilibrium alternate not only between di¤erent types within a country but also across countries. By
symmetry, I have
c1A;t = 1 + x+ "
p; c1A;t+1 = 1  x  "p; for type A in country 1;
c1B;t = 1 + x  "p; c1B;t+1 = 1  x+ "p; for type B in country 1;
c2A;t = 1  x  "p; c2A;t+1 = 1 + x+ "p; for type A in country 2;
c1B;t = 1  x+ "p; c1B;t+1 = 1 + x  "p; for type B in country 2.
The consumption structure implies two possibilities: "p > 0 and "p = 0:
"p > 0 means di¤erent types within the same country can not match consumption even though interna-
tional nancial markets are accessible, thus Type B agents with a less volatile consumption deviation must
be domestically participation constrained if the country is internationally participation constrained in trade
equilibrium. x and "p are jointly determined by three conditions. The rst two conditions are derived from
the fact that type A and B in country 1 are internationally participation constrained at the same time. For
both types in country 1, the present value of all future foreign net payments from t on being zero when
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discounted by domestic bond prices.
(x+ "p)  (y + ") + q [(y + ")  (x+ "p)]
1  pq = 0 for type A; (21)
(x  "p)  (y   ") + q [(y   ")  (x  "p)]
1  pq = 0 for type B.
The third condition says that if type B residents are participation constrained in domestic and international
nancial markets at the same time, then their continuation values in trade equilibrium and residents autarky
must be equalized at some even numbered period.
log(1 + x  "p) +  log(1  x+ "p) = log(1 + y   ") +  log(1  y + "): (22)
At even numbered period, the international bond price q equals to the highest MRS across the world,
q = 
1 + x+ "p
1  x  "p ; (23)
the domestic bond price in country 1 is q; 6 and the domestic bond price in country 2 equals to the lowest
MRS within 2,
p = 
1  x  "p
1 + x+ "p
:
As a result, the price sequences for domestically traded bonds are the same as (18) in section 4.1. There is
a unique solution to (21) and (22). The optimal solution requires q = 1; which further implies x+ "p = 1 1+
using (23) and "p is determined implicitly by equation (22). Given that y is large relative to ", as well as
"p > 0; I know xc < x  "p < 1 1+ from Figure 6.
On the other hand "p = 0 indicates international nancial markets help di¤erent types within the same
country to match consumption every period. Therefore, no one is constrained domestically and the MRS
is equalized in that country. x is then determined by (21). Use (23) again and get the optimal solution
x = 1 1+ ; "
p = 0:
4.4 A Comparison of Risk Sharing
Now I can compare the extent of self-enforcing deviation from consumption smoothing in the above three
scenarios. In section 4.1 (scenario 1), both types have the same deviation xJ = 1 1+ or y. In section 4.2
6 In contrast to the formal model, the MRS is not equalized within country 1 at period 0 in this simple example.
q = 
1 + x+ "p
1  x  "p > 
1 + x  "p
1  x+ "p ; if "
p > 0:
The reason is that residents will renege on domestic risk sharing contract as soon as they know their types.
20
(scenario 2), both types have the same deviation xc. In section 4.3 (scenario 3), either both types have the
same deviation x = 1 1+ or type A has deviation x+ "
p = 1 1+ while type B has deviation x  "p < 1 1+ . To
summarize,
0 < xc < x+ "p 6 xJ 6 y; for type A;
0 < xc < x  "p 6 xJ 6 y; for type B.
Adding domestic enforcement problem rules out the autarky solution, xJ = y; in scenario 1. For both
types, risk sharing levels are weakly improved. If type A and B cannot match consumption, then Bs
international risk sharing level is strictly improves by scenario 3, though the increment is smaller than the
one by centralization in scenario 2.
In conclusion, given the endowment structure with y relatively larger than ", I nd the domain

1 y
1+y ;  log(1+y)log(1 y)

for discount factor  where scenario 2 is always welfare superior than 1 or 3 and 3 is strictly better than 1.
This is the case I studied in section 3. What happens if the discount factor is high enough,  2
h
  log(1+y)log(1 y) ; 1
i
;
then one will observe complete international risk sharing in scenario 2 which can never be an equilibrium
allocation in scenario 1 and 3. If agents are extremely impatient,  2
h
0; 1 y1+y
i
; then both scenario 1 and 2
lead to the same equilibrium of autarky with complete domestic risk sharing xc = xJ = y. Scenario 3 would
result in autarky with no domestic risk sharing, x = y and "p = "; which is worse than scenario 1 and 2.
5 Conclusion
I have developed an open economy model with heterogeneous residents in each country sharing risk across
and within border. Risk of repudiation is pervasive in all debt contracts including both international and
domestic ones. The model and analysis is built on Jeskes private international borrowing model except
relaxing his assumption that domestic debt contracts are perfectly enforceable. In this paper, besides the
di¤erence in price, international debt contracts also di¤er from domestic ones in punishing strategy defaulters.
International debt defaulters are excluded only from international nancial markets while domestic debt
defaulters are denied from all nancial markets.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that an economy with pervasive enforcement problem does
better in international capital markets than an economy with enforcement problem on foreign debts alone.
The reason is that penalty on international debt repudiation in this model is at least as harsh as in Jeskes
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model and strictly harsher for some types with smoother endowment overtime. Thus, more international
borrowing and higher welfare can be supported for those lucky types of residents. Intuitively, capital control
internalizes the externality of individuals default decisions while pervasive commitment problem mitigates
the negative externality. The domestic bond pricing rules change in respond to the domestic credit crisis. In
my setup, domestic interest rate equals to the reciprocal of the lowest MRS in countries that are participation
constrained internationally. This overthrows the well established argument that interest rate should be the
lowest to induce repayment in an environment without legal enforcement on nancial contracts. This result
is due to the crucial ingredient of my model: in equilibrium domestic debt default can never happen without
international debt default. Although there is commitment problem within border, domestic debt repayment is
secured by preventing international debt default. For countries whose international participation constraint
is superuous, their domestic interest rate equals to prevailing international interest rate as in previous
literature.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Imagine an Arrow-Debreu setup in which there exists a domestic nancial market at period 0 for all kinds of
bonds that mature at any future period. Denote Pm(r) = Pm(r 1)pm(r 1; r) =
rY
s=0
pm(s) the forward
price for a r-period matured domestic contingent bond at period 0; where r 2 (0;1) and Pm(0) = pm(0) =
1: The proof proceeds in three steps:
Step 1: Redene the residents international autarky problem (RIA) started at t as follow
V mn (
t; bmn (
t))  max
fcmn (r)gr2[t;1)
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)); (RIAF)
subject to the summation of all future budget constraints after history t discounted to period 0
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)cmn (
r) =
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)emn (
r) + Pm(t)bmn (
t);
and the participation constraint in domestic nancial markets
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(cmn (r)) > Amn (r);
with
bmn (
t) and Pm(r) given,
for all histories t with r 2 [t;1) :
Lemma 1 The redened residents international autarky problem (RIAF ) has a unique maximum solution.
Proof. Prove by contradiction. Suppose there are two di¤erent optimal solutions to problem (RIAF ):n
cm;Dn;1 (
r)
o
r2[t;1)
and
n
cm;Dn;2 (
r)
o
s2[t;1)
: Create another consumption allocation
n
cm;Dn;3 (
r)
o
r2[r;1)
as a
linear combination of the above two, i.e.,
cm;Dn;3 (
r) = cm;Dn;1 (
r) + (1  )cm;Dn;2 (r)
for any  2 (0; 1) and history r with r 2 [t;1) : Thus,
n
cm;Dn;3 (
r)
o
r2[t;1)
is both a¤ordable and individual
rational since strictly concave utility function implies
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(cm;Dn;3 (s)) >
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(cm;Dn;1(2)(s)) > Amn (r);
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for all histories r with r 2 [t;1) : But
n
cm;Dn;3 (
r)
o
r2[t;1)
makes one strictly better o¤ at the rst place if
one sets r = t, which contradicts with the assumption that
n
cm;Dn;1 (
r)
o
r2[t;1)
and
n
cm;Dn;2 (
r)
o
t2[t;1)
are the
optimal solutions.
Step 2: For Fmn (
t) 2 R; dene another optimization problem (RPF) as an augmented version of (RIAF)
Wm;Fn (
t; bmn (
t); F (t))  max
fcmn (r)gr2[t;1)
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)); (RPF)
subject to the summation of all future budget constraints after history t discounted to period 0
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)cmn (
r) =
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)emn (
r) + Pm(t)bmn (
t) + Fmn (
t);
and the participation constraint in domestic nancial markets
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(cmn (s)) > Amn (r);
with
bmn (
t); Fmn (
t) and Pm(r) given,
for all histories r with r 2 [t;1) :
Consider all histories t and initial bond holdings bmn (
t) with t 2 [0;1) : By denition, the value function
of problem (RIAF) equals to the value function of problem (RPF) given Fmn (
t) = 0:
V mn (
t; bmn (
t)) =Wm;Fn (
t; bmn (
t); 0);
If one denes
Fmn (
t) =
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)
24fmn (r) X
r+1
q(r; r+1)f
m
n (
r; r+1)
35 ;
then the continuation value of the original residents problem (RP) at t equals to the value function of the
newly dened problem (RPF).
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)) =Wm;Fn (t; bmn (t); Fmn (t)):
But this equality is true only if the international participation constraints (4) in (RP) are also satised in
(RPF).
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)) > V mn (t; bmn (t)):
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Substitute both sides of the constraints for value functions in (RPF) to get
Wm;Fn (
t; bmn (
t); Fmn (
t)) >Wm;Fn (t; bmn (t); 0):
Since Wm;Fn (
t; bmn (
t); ) is strictly increasing in Fmn (t); the above inequality further implies
Fmn (
t) > 0:
What is more, if (4) holds with equality, then Fmn (
r) = 0. By now, the reasoning su¢ ces to prove the
following lemma 2
Lemma 2 For all m;n and t with t 2 [0;1) ; the international participation constraint (4) at t implies
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)
24fmn (r) X
r+1
q(r; r+1)f
m
n (
r; r+1)
35 > 0:
Moreover, if (4) holds with equality at t, then
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)
24fmn (r) X
r+1
q(r; r+1)f
m
n (
r; r+1)
35 = 0:
Step 3: Now I am ready to prove proposition 1. For some n;m and t with t 2 [0;1) ; mn (t) > 0
implies that the international participation constraint of type n residents in country m holds with equal-
ity at t: Lemma 2 concludes Fmn (
t) = 0: By denition, the consumption allocation

cm;Dn (
r)
	
r2[t;1)
solves problem (RIA) started at t and the other one fcmn (r)gr2[0;1) solves problem (RP) at period 0.
That is to say,

cm;Dn (
r)
	
r2[t;1) solves W
m;F
n (
t; bmn (
t); 0) and fcmn (r)gr2[t;1)  fcmn (r)gr2[0;1) solves
Wm;Fn (
t; bmn (
t); Fmn (
t)): Since Fmn (
t) = 0; these two optimal allocations both solve Wm;Fn (
t; bmn (
t); 0),
i.e., they both solve the residents international autarky problem (RIA) and its redened problem (RIAF)
with value function V mn (
t; bmn (
t)): Finally, by Lemma 1, the optimization problem (RIAF) having unique
solution proves that cm;Dn (
r) and cmn (
r) are identical at all histories r with r 2 [t;1) :
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In equilibrium, bond prices are determined by (13) and (14) for all histories (t; t+1) with t 2 [0;1).8><>: p(
t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t)) (t+1jt)
1+A2 (1+(t;t+1))A1
1+A3
;
q(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t)) (t+1jt) 1+A21+A3 ;
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where
A1 = (
t; t+1)
 t 1U 0(cD(
t; t+1))
U 0(c(t; t+1))
1
(t; t+1)
;
A2 =
t+1X
s=0
X
t;t+1js
(s) s
(t; t+1js)
(t; t+1)
;
A3 =
tX
s=0
X
tjs
(s) s
(tjs)
(t)
:
The proof shows in three steps how the interaction between international and domestic bond prices makes
di¤erent types reach their upper limits of international borrowing at the same time.
Step 1: Consider the international bond pricing rule (14), the Lagrange multipliers imposed on the
international participation constraints must be non-negative.
(t; t+1) > 0)
A2 = A3 + (
t; t+1)
 t 1 1
(t; t+1)
> A3;
and
A2 = A3 if (
t; t+1) = 0:
Therefore, the international bond price represents the highest MRS among all types in all countries.
q(t; t+1) > 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt); with equality iif mn (t; t+1) = 0: (A.1)
Step 2: Consider the domestic bond pricing rule (13) in any country. Substitute all the As and rearrange
p(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)8>>><>>>:1 +
(1  U 0(cD(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t;t+1))
)(
t;t+1)
 t 1
(t;t+1)
  U 0(cD(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t;t+1))
(t;t+1)(
t;t+1)
 t 1
((t;t+1))
1 +
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
(s) s (
tjs)
(t)
9>>>=>>>; :
For some type n in m; if one observes mn (
t; t+1) = 0; then the domestic bond price in m is determined by
ns MRS.
pm(t; t+1) = 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt):
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If one observes mn (
t; t+1) > 0 instead, then cm;Dn (
t; t+1) = c
m
n (
t; t+1) by proposition 1. The relation-
ship between domestic bond price in m and ns MRS is
pm(t; t+1) = 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt)
266641 
mn (
t;t+1)
m
n (
t;t+1)
 t 1
((t;t+1))
1 +
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
mn (
s) s (
tjs)
(t)
37775 : (A.2)
The Lagrange multipliers imposed on domestic participation constraints in problem (RIA) must be non-
negative.
vmn (
t; t+1) > 0)
pm(t; t+1) 6 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt); with equality if vmn (t; t+1) = 0: (A.3)
Step 3: If mn (
t; t+1) > 0 for some type n residents in country m; then (A.1) and (A.3) together ensure
that the international bond price is strictly greater than the domestic one in m:
q(t; t+1) > 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
> pm(t; t+1))
q(t; t+1) > p
m(t; t+1):
This strict inequality, the other way around, implies that multipliers mn (
t; t+1) are positive for all types
in m as well.
q(t; t+1) > p
m(t; t+1))

U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt)
1 +Amn;2
1 +Amn;3
> 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt)
1 +Amn;2  
 
1 + mn (
t; t+1)

Amn;1
1 +Amn;3
)
 
1 + mn (
t; t+1)

mn (
t; t+1)
 r 1 1
(t; t+1jt)
> 0) 
1 + mn (
t; t+1)

mn (
t; t+1) > 0:
Since mn (
t; t+1) > 0 for all n in m; I have
mn (
t; t+1) > 0; for all n;m:
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Given mn (
t) > 0 for some n;m at t with t 2 [0;1) ; the international participation constraint in residents
problem is binding at t.
1X
r=t
r t
X
rjt
(rjt)U(cmn (r)) = V mn (t; bmn (t));
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where cmn (
r) and bmn (
t) are the optimal consumption at r and the optimal domestic bond holdings at
t in problem (RP). The value function V mn (
t; bmn (
t)) of problem (RIA) started at t a¤ects the optimal
consumption allocation after t in problem (RP) through this binding constraint. In addition, mn (
r) > 0
for the same n and m above with r 2 [t;1) implies the domestic participation constraint in residents
international autarky problem is bind at r:
1X
s=r
s r
X
sjr
(sjr)U(cm;Dn (s; t; bmn (t))) = Amn (r);
where cm;Dn (
s; t; bmn (
t)) denotes the optimal consumption at s in problem (RIA) started at t with initial
domestic bond holdings bmn (
t). This equation implicitly denes bmn (
t) = B
m
n (
t):
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
By lemma 2 and proposition 3, the international participation constraint (4) at t with t 2 [0;1) implies
the following set of inequality and equality constraints8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
X1
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)
24fmn (r) X
r+1
q(r; r+1)f
m
n (
r; r+1)
35 > 0;
bmn (
t; t+1) = B
m
n (
t; t+1) if mn (
t; t+1) > 0 and
mn (
r; r+1) > 0 for some 
r with r 2 [t;1) :
(A.4)
The proof proceeds in the following three steps: dene, solve and compare.
Step 1: For all histories t with t 2 [0;1) ; replacing (4) in problem (RP) with weaker constraints (A.4)
creates an alternative (convex) residents problem (RPa).
max
fcmn (t);bmn (t;t+1);fmn (t;t+1)gt2[0;1)
1X
t=0
t
X
t
(t)U(cmn (
t)); (RPa)
subject to the budget constraint
emn (
t) + bmn (
t) + fmn (
t)
> cmn (t) +
X
t+1
pm(t; t+1)b
m
n (
t; t+1) +
X
t+1
q(t; t+1)f
m
n (
t; t+1); (A.5)
the weaker version of participation constraint in international nancial market
1X
r=t
X
rjt
Pm(r)
24fmn (r) X
r+1
q(r; r+1)f
m
n (
r; r+1)
35 > 0 (A.6)
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and
bmn (
t; t+1) = B
m
n (
t; t+1) if mn (
t; t+1) > 0 and
mn (
r; r+1) > 0 for some 
r with r 2 [t;1) ; (A.7)
the no-Ponzi conditions
bmn (
t; t+1) >  B; fmn (t; t+1) >  F ;
with initial bond holdings
bmn (
0); fmn (
0) given
and bond price sequences
pm(t; t+1); q(
t; t+1) given,
for all histories t and all states
 
t; t+1

with t 2 [0;1) : Let   t ; f  t and b  t be the Lagrange
multiplier on budget constraint (A.5), non-negative foreign capital inow condition (A.6), domestic bond
holding restriction (A.7), respectively.
First order conditions are: with respect to c(t);
(t) = t(t)U 0(c(t));
with respect to b(t; t+1);
p(t; t+1)(
t) =
8><>: (
t; t+1)  b(t; t+1) if (t; t+1) > 0; (r; r+1) > 0;
(t; t+1) otherwise;
and with respect to f(t; t+1);
q(t; t+1)(
t) = (t; t+1) +
t+1X
s=0
X
t;t+1js
f (
s)P (t; t+1) 
rX
s=0
X
tjs
f (
s)P (t)q(t; t+1):
Use all rst order conditions to generate domestic and international bond pricing rules as follow
p(t; t+1) =
8><>: 
U 0(c(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t)) (t+1jt)[1  b(
t;t+1)
(t;t+1)
] if (t; t+1) > 0; (
r; r+1) > 0;
 U
0(c(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t)) (t+1jt) otherwise,
(A.8)
and
q(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)
1 +
Xt+1
s=0
X
t;t+1js
f (
s)P (t;t+1)
(t;t+1)
1 +
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
f (
s)P (t)
(t)
: (A.9)
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Step 2: Consider any one country in the world and all histories (t; t+1) with (
t; t+1) > 0 since
non-convexity only becomes problematic when the international participation constraints are binding.
For types of residents with (t; t+1) > 0 and (
r; r+1) = 0 at all 
r with r 2 [t;1) ; or nA types as
in the model, the domestic bond pricing rule (A.8) degenerates into
p(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt) = (
t; t+1)
(t)
: (A.10)
The Arrow-Debreu price of a (t+ 1)-period matured domestic bond at period 0 can be, therefore, written as
P (t; r+1) = P (
t)p(t; t+1) = P (
t)
(t; t+1)
(t)
:
Plug it into the international bond pricing rule (A.9) to get
q(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)
1 +
Xt+1
s=0
X
t;t+1js
f (
s)P (t)
(t)
1 +
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
f (
s)P (t)
(t)
:
To rescale the Lagrange multipliers f (
s), dene
0f (
s) = f (
s)s
P (t)(t; t+1)
(t)(t; t+1js)
; (A.11)
where (t) > 0 since the budget constraint always binds in equilibrium and notice
(t; t+1js)
(t; t+1)
=
(t+1jt)(tjs)
(t+1jt)(t)
=
(tjs)
(t)
:
Using the denition of (A.11) to replace f (
s) yileds
q(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)
1 +
Xt+1
s=0
X
t;t+1js
0f (
s) s (
t;t+1js)
(t;t+1)
1 +
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
0f (
s) s (
tjs)
(t)
: (A.12)
For types of residents in the same country with (t; t+1) > 0 and (
r; r+1) > 0 at some 
r with
r 2 [t;1) ; or nB types as in the model, they must confront with the same international and domestic bond
prices as determined above. To rescale the Lagrange multipliers b(
t; t+1), dene
0b(
t; t+1)  b(
t; t+1)
U 0(c(t; t+1))0f (
t; t+1)
 t
241 + tX
s=0
X
tjs
0f (
s) s
(tjs)
(t)
35 ; (A.13)
where 0f (
t; t+1) > 0 since the non-negative foreign capital inow condition always binds in equilibrium.
Then the domestic bond pricing rule (A.8) for types nB suggests
p(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)[1  b(
t; t+1)
(t; t+1)
]:
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Using the denition of (A.13) to replace b(
r; r+1) generates
p(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt) (A.14)266641  
0
b(
t; t+1)
0
f (
t; t+1)
 t 1 1
(t;t+1)
1 +
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
0f (
s) s (
tjs)
(t)
37775
if (t; t+1) > 0; (
r; r+1) > 0:
Step 3: Now recall bond prices (14) and (13) in trade equilibrium with all the As substituted away.
q(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)1 +A2
1 +A3
= 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)
1 +
Xt+1
s=0
X
t;t+1js
(s) s (
t;t+1js)
(t;t+1)
1 +
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
(s) s (
tjs)
(t)
; (A.15)
and
p(t; t+1) = 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)
1 +A2  
 
1 + (t; t+1)

A1
1 +A3
= 
U 0(c(t; t+1))
U 0(c(t))
(t+1jt)266664
1 +
Xt+1
s=0
X
t;t+1js
(s) s (
t;t+1js)
(t;t+1)
  (1+(
t;t+1))(t;t+1)
(t;t+1)
 t 1 U
0(cD(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t;t+1))
1 +
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
(s) s (
tjs)
(t)
377775
=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
 U
0(c(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t)) (t+1jt)26641  (t;r+1)(t;t+1) t 1 1(t;t+1)
1+
Xt
s=0
X
tjs
(s) s (
tjs)
(t)
3775 if (t; t+1) > 0; (r; r+1) > 0;
 U
0(c(t;t+1))
U 0(c(t)) (t+1jt) otherwise.
(A.16)
Notice that the domestic bond pricing rules (A.14) plus (A.10) and international bond pricing rule (A.12)
in the alternative (convex) residents problem (RPa) are, respectively, identical to the correspnding ones
(A.16) and (A.15) from the original (non-convex) residents problem (RP). Both maximization problems
have identical rst order conditions, hence same optimal solution. I have dened an alternative maximization
problem with the same objective function and a convex constraint set that is a super set of the original (non-
convex in general) constraint set. The optimal solution is a global maximum for problem (RPa) because of
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convexity. Therefore, it must be the global maximum for the original problem (RP), which has the same
objective function and rst order conditions as in problem (RPa) except for a smaller constraint set. This
proves the su¢ ciency of rst order conditions for a global max in the original problem (RP).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
As the proposition itself, the proof has been divided into three parts:
Part 1: For the analysis below, consider any history (t; t+1) with t 2 [0;1) : The rst part of
proposition 5 can be easily read o¤ from inequality (A.1) in the proof of proposition 2.
q(t; t+1) > 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt); for all n;m: (A.17)
Part 2: Without loss of generality, suppose residents with the highest MRS across the world live in
some countries m as some types n, where m and n are subsets of f1; 2; :::;Mg and f1; 2; :::; Ng ; respectively.
Then their MRS determines the international bond price.
q(t; t+1) = 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt) and mn (t; t+1) = 0:
By proposition 2, mn (
t; t+1) = 0 implies that mn (
t; t+1) = 0 for all other types in m; where n  =
f1; 2; :::; Ng n n: Equation (A.2) in the proof of proposition 2 tells us
pm(t; t+1) = 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt) for all n in m:
The MRS is equalized within country m: Therefore,
pm(t; t+1) = q(
t; t+1) for all m: (A.18)
All the other countries m  = f1; 2; :::;Mgnm which are internationally participation constrained as a whole
have
q(t; t+1) < 
U 0(cm
 
n (
t; t+1))
U 0(cm n (
t))
(t+1jt) and m n (t; t+1) > 0, for all n in m :
Inequality (A.3) in the proof of proposition 2 yields
pm
 
(t; t+1) 6 
U 0(cm
 
n (
t; t+1))
U 0(cm n (
t))
(t+1jt) for all n in m : (A.19)
For all countries, combining equation (A.18) and inequality (A.19) together to get
pm(t; t+1) =
8><>: 6 
U 0(cmn (
t;t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt) if mn (t; t+1) > 0;
= q(t; t+1) if mn (
t; t+1) = 0;
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or more general like the second part of proposition 5
pm(t; t+1) 6 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt); for all n;m: (A.20)
Part 3: Connecting inequality (A.17) and (A.20) in one direction,
pm(t; t+1) 6 
U 0(cmn (
t; t+1))
U 0(cmn (
t))
(t+1jt) 6 q(t; t+1);
or more directly,
pm(r; r+1) 6 q(r; r+1); for all m;
which proves the third part of proposition 5.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
Step 1: First of all, assume that bond price sequence

pm(t; t+1); q(
t; t+1)
	
t2[0;1)
in problem (RP) and
(RPJ) are identical. I will show later that they are indeed the same in the two maximization problems
corresponding equilibria. Consider any type n residents in country m at t with initial domestic bond
holdings bmn
 
t

and bond prices fpm(r; r+1); q(r; r+1)g
r2[t;1)
given. The constraint set of the post-
default maximization problem (RIA) is a subset of problem (RIAJ)s constraint set since the former set
contains constraint (2) to prevent domestic debt default. Therefore, the optimal solution to the (RIA)
problem is always feasible in the (RIAJ) problem, which proves the following
V m;Jn (
t; bmn (
t)) > V mn (t; bmn (t)); for all t; bmn (t):
Using the same argument in the other direction, that is, noting that the constraint set of (RPJ) is a subset
of (RP)s constraint set proves the result that adding domestic enforcement problem makes every type in all
countries weakly better.
Maximization problem (RP) and (RPJ) will have the same consumption allocation if
V m;Jn (
t; bmn (
t)) = V mn (
t; bmn (
t)); for all t; bmn (
t):
For them to be equal in all histories, the domestic participation constraint (2) must be slack at all future
histories r with r 2 [t;1) in problem (RIA) started at any present hisotry t with t 2 [0;1) : In other
words, the optimal consumption path for nA types residents with mn (
r) = 0 for all r stays unchanged in
the above two residents problems. And I know from the domestic bond pricing rule (13) that pm(t; t+1) is
35
determined by the MRS of type nA residents. As a result, the domestic price sequences in the two problems
are identical and so are the international bond price sequences since international price is the maximum
among all domestic prices.
Step 2: I can now prove the main result that adding domestic enforcement problem strictly improve
type nBs utility. Remember type nB residents are dened as those who are indi¤erent between repaying
and reneging domestic debt in residents international autarky problem. By assumption, we have
U 0
 
cmn (
t; t+1)

U 0
 
cmn
 
t
 6= U 0  cm1 (t; t+1)
U 0
 
cm1
 
t
 : (A.21)
Without loss of generality, I assume type 1 residents belong to types nA; then the domestic bond price in m
is determined by type 1s MRS
pm(t; t+1) = 
U 0(cm1 (
t; t+1))
U 0(cm1 (
t))
(t+1jt):
Compare it with equation (A.2) and use (A.21), I can conclude
mn (
t; t+1); 
m
n (
t; t+1) > 0:
As a result, type n residents are really type nB residents whose continuation value after (
t; t+1) in
residents problem (RP) equals to the one in residents international autarky problem (RIA) since the inter-
national participation constraint (4) binds, and again equals to the one in residents autarky problem (RA)
started at (t; t+1) since the domestic participation constraint (2) binds.
Also by assumption fm;Jn (
r; r+1) < 0; which implies two things for the same type n residents above
but in problem (RPJ). One thing is that type ns consumption allocation is neither residents international
autarky nor residents autarky after (r; r+1), and another is that the international participation constraint
(15) binds because otherwise one can always attain higher utility by borrowing more from foreigners as long
as (15) is slack.
Next, recall proposition 1, the result extends to (RPJ). That is, with a binding international participation
constraint, the equilibrium consumption path in problem (RPJ) from (r; r+1) onward is identical to the path
after international debt default in the (RIAJ) problem. Since the consumption path after (r; r+1) in (RIAJ)
is not resident autarkic while it sure is in (RIA), the continuation values are such that V mn (
t; bmn (
t)) <
V m;Jn (
t; bm;Jn (
t)) because of strictly concave objective function.
Thus, type n in problem (RP) without domestic commitment can relax the international participation
constraint (4) in history that has a stictly positive Lagrange multiplier, thereby borrow more from outside
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the country and increase utility to a new level which is strictly greater than the one in problem (RPJ) with
full domestic commitment.
A.7 Derivation of the Zero Net Payment condition (16)
As in the proof of proposition 1. Denote Pt =
tY
r=0
pr the Arrow-Debreu price at date 0 for a domestic
contingent bond matured after t periods in country 1. The one-period domestic bond price sequence in
country 1 is known as
pr =
8><>: p; r = 0; 2; 4; :::;q; r = 1; 3; 5; :::;
then use it to get
fPtgt2[0;1) =

p; pq; p2q; p2q2; p3q2; p3q3; :::
	
:
By symmetry, the net payment to foreign country 2 at period t is denoted by Nt with the following pattern
Nt =
8><>: x
J   y; t = 0; 2; 4; :::
y   xJ ; t = 1; 3; 5; :::
:
According to lemma 2, when I discount all future net payments to period 0 using fPtgt2[0;1) and add them
up, I will get zero if country 1 is internationally participation constrained at present date 0.
1X
t=0
NtPt = 0:
Substitute the expressions for Nt and Pt into the above equation to get the zero captial inow condition (16)
in section 4.1.
0 = (xJ   y)(P0 + P2 + P4 + :::) + (y   xJ)(P1 + P3 + P5 + :::)
= (xJ   y)(p+ p2q + p3q2 + :::) + (y   xJ)(pq + p2q2 + p3q3 + :::)
= (xJ   y)p
1X
s=1
ps 1qs 1 + (y   xJ)
1X
s=1
psqs
=
(xJ   y)p
1  pq +
(y   xJ)pq
1  pq
=
p

(xJ   y) + q(y   xJ)
1  pq
=
(xJ   y) + q(y   xJ)
1  pq :
The same method is used to derive equation (21) in section 4.3.
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Int'l PC (4) binds
Domestic PC (5) binds
Peak
c*
(4) ">"
(5) ">"
Level curves of E[u(c)]
Figure 1: Redundant Domestic Constraint
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Figure 2: Ex-Ante Expected Utility
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Figure 3: Full Consumption Smoothing
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Figure 4: Autarky
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Figure 5: Some International Risk Sharing
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Figure 6: Trade Equilibrium Allocation
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Measure Type n Country m
m = 1 m = 2
1
2 n = A 1 + y + " 1  y   "
1
2 n = B 1 + y   " 1  y + "
1
2 (A+B) 1 + y 1  y
Table 1: Endowment Structure at Even Numbered Period
Measure Type n Country m
m = 1 m = 2
1
2 n = A 1  y   " 1 + y + "
1
2 n = B 1  y + " 1 + y   "
1
2 (A+B) 1 + y 1  y
Table 2: Endowment Structure at Odd Numbered Period
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